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Reply to Carol Brownson and Jack C. Wolf 
Noel Carroll 
Let me begin by commnting on some points Carol Brownson 
.akea that I think are correct and vhtch have helped ae to 
clarify for ayaelf the nature of •Y � project. She says, 
-Rather than giving a partial definition of nonf tction, he has 
described a rea&onable and respectable standard of evaluation 
applicable to ftlaa that lay claim to objectivity • • • •  - I think 
Brownson t& right that I should steer clear of attempting to 
def tne nonfiction for the very reason that it ta not a hont0ge­
neoua claa& of things but a �inch of things lumped together 
only because they are not f i c t ions. 
In ., paper, I really had in mind using nonfiction a16 a 
label for all aorta of films of purported fact -- historical 
ftl•a, anthropological films, films of current events ,  etc. I 
vented to say, contrary to 11&ny contemporary theorists, that 
such ftl•a of purported fact can be objective as vell as having 
certain other features in common -- e . g . ,  reference to the 
actual world. But I made these point& by speaking as though 
nonf i c t t on fil• vae an essentially unified class, when it ta 
not . I should have 11ade II'/ points by saying -historical fJlma 
can be objective , ·  ·anthropological films can be objecti v e , "  
*sociological film& can be objective , �  e t c .  rather than by 
ape.aktng of n·onfiction ftl•s tout court. )ty argument i s  really 
that fil•& of putative fact can be objective and not that 
ever�thtng that ta not f ictton ha& some epi&temic standard of 
evaluation Ernie Gehr'e Serene Velocity ta not fiction but 
i t  does not have an accot!lpanying set of standards for epiatelaic 
evaluation. Throughout the essay, I generally use ·nonfiction· 
to refer to various genr� of fil.a of putative fact (journal­
i s t ic reports, historical fil11& e t c . ) .  But at t111ea I slip 
into talk of a ho110geneoua genre of nonfiction films vhich I 
aug�at that I can partially define, vhen, indeed, a l l  I 
actually should be claiming ta that fil11& of putative fact can 
be adjudged objective i n  ter11& of the prevailing standards of 
e p i stemic evaluation of the types of knowledge claiftiS that the 
films that make said knowledge claims present. Aleo I ain 
.. king the related generaltiation that this ·genre· of nonf tc­
tion films aakea reference to the vorld. Brawnaon 'a remarka on 
•Y confusions here are ver� uaef u l .  
On the other hand, I have great d i f ficulty understanding 
Brownson ' &  points about objectivity. She urges us to dro� the 
objectivity/subjectivity dtchotoey in dtacuaatng documentary 
f i l m  but never really explains vhy we shoul d do this. She 
suggests that I have redefined the concept of ob.1ectivtty· i n  
terms of adherence to tnteraubjecttvely aaaeaaable practices of 
reasoning and evidence gathering. But I am not sure that I 
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have introduced • new ute•ntng of ·objecttvtty . w  Admi ttedly I 
d o  not .ean Oy wobjectt vtty" "•elf-evident cer·tatnty . .  8ut nor 
do many conte•porar� theort ats. The conte•J>Orary concept of 
objectivity, dat1"1 back. to Petree and Huaaerl, tt  aeewa to me ,  
center• 011 the notion of tnteraubj ecttve validation. I haven•t 
redefined �objecttvttyw but have e•ployed one :major prevailing 
conception of t t .  
Brownaon alao thiaka that I •• wrong t n  thinking that moat 
C Ollml!ntatora vho conclude that ftl• ta neceaaartly eubject tve 
are rea trtctini their argument• to f ilm. She holds that indeed 
such commentators be l i eve more broadly that all  knowled�e 
cla1118 are aubje ctive.  There ta no vay to finally adjudicate 
tht• controveray save by counting caaea . But tn wy favor I 
would potnt out that .. ny of the theortata who hold that 
nonf tctton film• are aubjecttve are "arxt a t a .  And Harxt sta. 
one auppoaea, can't hold that all knowledge clat'llS are sub­
jective tDBof ar aa their theory 1• propoaed •• being acten­
ttftcally and objectively verifiable. 
Much of Brovnaon'• dtacuaaton of ob.1ecttvity ta preoccupied 
with aketchtng two argueents (that ult1Mtely collapae into 
one) that she think• •tght be leading com.entatora to claim 
that the nonfiction f tl• ta aubjecttve. Thea e,  moreover, are 
argument• that I f atled to foreclose. Bot� these ar«umenta 
have aa their crucial premise the notion that language 1 •  
aubjecttve. Thus, ftl9ofar a a  f i l •  t a  language-like, i t  t o o  t a  
alwaya aubjecttve. 
Frankly, neither of the argument• perauade me ,  apectftcally 
becauae I do not know what to Mke of the tde• that ·1anguage 
ta aubject tve . ·  Language ta • ahared tool of a cultural 
coemuntty. A language doea not �tat aolely t n  an tndtvtdua l 'e 
•ind. Indeed W t t tgenatetn haa proved that • private language 
1• t•poaatble. What could t t  mean to ••Y that language t a  
aubjecttve other than that t t  1 •  t n  the province o f  a atngle 
conactouaneaa� Indeed, I doubt the idea that language ta 
aubject tve can be tntelltgtbly interpreted. Thus, I do not 
believe that either of the ar�umenta that Brownson invents are 
available for ftla theortata atnce both require the either 
untntellt�tble or t•poaatble propoa ttton that language t a  
eubjectt ve,, 
The first argument states that atnce f1lG18 do not mechan­
ically mirror reality . they are intensional . If they ire 
tntenatonal, they are language-like.. If they are languaRe­
ltka. they are subjective. I have already rejected the last 
propoattton tn thta aertea •• untntelltgtble. But I don't 
undeTIStaod the earlier part• of the argu�nt either. I •• not 
sure that the fact that ftl.a don't automatically ••trrorM 
real tty ahov& they are '"intensional ... Indeed, I am not sure 
that I understand the meaning of the vord '"tntenatona1· here. 
Ia tt that ftl•a must be understood ea aOMhow analogous to 
referentially opaq ue context a. But why! Don 't  eome ftl111 
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i.ages warrant inferences about things in front of the ea11era? 
What does the fact that t� camera lens has to be adjusted 
i . e . ,  that the eamera does not operate entirely autoaati·callY 
b u t  requires so� hurun manipulation -- have to do with whether 
or not the reference of the shot is referentia lly transparent 
or opaq ue '!  
Brownson takes the supposed intensional d i me nsion o f  film 
t o  support the claim that it is language-like. This see�s to 
be very slim grounds for accepting a language /film analogy. 
And. of course> even if we do accept the langua ge/film analo�y. 
I doubt that sense can be a.ade of the claim that language i s  
subjective. 
Brownson'& second arguoent charges that I a t t ribute too 
simplistic an error to those who be l i eve that filas have 
points-of-view. I argue that theorists are led t o  this be l i e f  
e i t h e r  by equivocations on the conceot of ·point-of-view , ·  O T  
through a fallacy o f  composition - - every shot has a literal 
p . o . v . ,  therefore, the film as a whole has a viewpoint. 
Against my accusation of equivoca t i o n ,  she says that the 
d i f ferent applicat ions of the concept of point-of-view are 
related by me t aphoric expans i o n .  I agree. Indeed, some of the 
expansions are very nice me t aphors . 8ut what di f ference does 
t h i s  make? One CAn s t i l l  not jump inferentially from a literal 
t o  a me t aphoric sense of ·point-of-view· and a�t as though one 
is s t i l l  speaking uni�oca l l y .  
In answer t o  ffl'J argument that theorists commit a f alla·cy of 
compos i t i o n  when they move from the literal p . o . v .  of the shot 
to the claim that the f i l m  as a whole has a personal vision. 
Carol Brownson suggests I have cisconstrued what theorists 
really have in mind. They actually hold her first argu"'l!nt - ­
f i l ms  are not mechanical; thus, they are language-like; thus 
they are subjective because language is subjective. Again I 
t h i nk that the latter claim is unintelligible. I have rejected 
t h e  claim that films are significantly language-like elsewhere 
as have other theorists. I And lastly, I think it is a mistake 
t o  treat ·saechanical� and �language-like· as logical contraries 
that exclusively carve up the field of inquiry. 
Brownson criticizes my approach because I do n o t  allow for 
gentle c r i t i c i s m  in cases such ae The Graduate where the 
character is going in the wrong direction on the Golden Gate 
Bridge. I a m  tempted t o  re&pond that in the f i c t i onal w o r l d  of 
The Graduate the relation between the f i c t ional Berkeley and 
the f i c t ional San Francisco is oppos i t e  that customarily 
experienced by California drivers. 
Finally, Brownson seems worried that my way of treating the 
d i s tinction between f i c t i o n  and nonfiction suggests an endorse­
aent of a cleavage between pleasure and knowledge. I d o n ' t  see 
why she fears t h i s .  At several points in the essay I .. ke 
clear that I do not be li eve that nonfiction writing and nonfic­
t i o n  film must eschew aesthetic ornamentation and elaboration. 
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One of Jack Wolf 'e biggeet proble1M vith sy paper ta hie 
fear that l give Ula producers too much authority vhen I 
aaaign the• full responsib i l i t y  for indexing fil 111 aa "non­
f i c t ional . �  At thia point, wolf caaplaine -1 do not agree vith 
Carro l l ' •  position that the label of the producer ia the one 
and only criterion acceptable for de ter•tntng the category of 
( a ]  ftl,.. If the producer aaya the product ta true to 'actual 
reality' and tt ta demotWtrably false to that 'actual real i ty , '  
then i t  t a  fiction, an untruth, and the label should be re­
jected.· Jack Wolf's dtaaatiafacttone tn thta .atter, I 
believe. uodervri.te the reservations he votcee to try approach 
throughout hta response. But I aa not ao aure that there ta an 
outrt�ht dtaagreement between us rather than •i•ply s •1aunder­
atand1ng .. 
Wolf uaea the te1'118 RftcttonR and Rnonfiction· differently 
than I advoca te. Por him •fictionR • •talse· or •untrue , ·  
vhtle Rnonf tcttonR • Rtrue . R  Thus, he ts vorrted that a 
producer @Wlpovered to tnde� a fil� aa nonfiction ta being 
licensed to declare the f t l •  •true , ·  aa if JRerely aaytng 
aoaething ta ao could 1111ke it a o .  Wolf aaya if ve can ahow the 
fil• ta f alae, then i t  ta fiction - no aatter how the producer 
indexes i t .  
But I do not correlate nonf tctton vtth the truth, nor d o  I 
believe that tt ta advisable to equate fiction v1th falsity . 
I t  ta not falae that Scarlet O ' Hara lived on a plantation 
called Tara. It ta only - vell - ftcttonel. Hor doea the 
fact that Chariot of the Gode 1a nonfiction aake i t  true. I t  
only makea Chariot o f  the Gode a candidate for evaluation tn 
te1'118 of li teral truth or f aleity -- something the propoa ttton 
"Scarlet O ' Hara lived on Tara· is not. 
We can call the uee o f  the fict ion/nonfiction dichotomy to 
c omaen d  or to dteparage tteaa aa true or f alee the nor1mattve 
eanse of the dichotomy. That 1 11 .  it honors or ranks or grades 
the true and the f alee by ..eana of the appellattone RftcttonM 
and ·nonftctton.· Throughout hie co•eents Wolf has the norae­
ttve uee of the1e ter.a tn •ind . And given thi1 he i1 upset 
because he thinks that I a• gtvtng f t lmaakera the right to 
establish that their ftlae are crue no matter what the rest of 
ue clearly know the facts to be. Certainly Wolf 111 correct t o  
reject such a proapect. l u t  I don ' t  think that ., �per opens 
this particular Pandora 's Box. 
For I do not uee the f i c t i oo/nonfiction distinction in the 
nor.ati•e aet1Be. l do not think that tn indexing a f i l •  as 
nonfiction the fil ... ker declares that tt ie tnJe but only that 
tt 111 to be evaluated agatnet the standards of truthfulne s s .  
Indeed, vhen meaaured agatnet those etandarde, a f t l m  t h a t  has 
been indexed aa nonf tctton .. y turn out to be false. At that 
point. 110reover, I am not dtspo�ed t o  re-label the film as 
Rf tctton· aa proponent• of the non.attve usage •ight. I am 
contented to eay etmply that th� file 111 f alee. 
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1 would identify my use of the nonfiction/fict ion distinc­
t ion as classificatory not n o rma t i v e .  To index something as 
f i c t i onal classifies it as belotljlin� to a category of things to 
which truth and f a l s i t y  do not pertain. In saying something i s  
fict ional I no wore Bl!an to chastise the f i l m  for being false 
than I mean to caamend the truthfulness of other thin�s by 
calling them -nonf i c t i o n . - •Nonf iction- only signals me�berahip 
in the clAss of things to which standards of truth or falsity 
can be appl.ied; the badge , .. nonf i c t i o n ,  - does not prejudge the 
outcome of such appraisals. 
I f  Jack Wolf were to review my approach with the recogni­
tion that I use the nonf iction/fiction distinction in the 
clAssificatory and not the nonnative sense, I think he might 
wi thdraw some of his objections. Yor, of course, I agree Vith 
him that i t  is utterly absurd to 'be l i eve that a filmmaker can 
establish the truth of a documentary simply by a.sserttng that 
i t  is true ( o r  by saying it i s  -nonfictional , "  where t h i s ,  
inadvisably, i s  regarded as synonyDtOus w i t h  -true · ) .  
NOTE 
1 • Noel Carroll, -Tova rd a Theory of Film Editi� , "  M i l lenniu!ll 
Film Journa l ,  13 ( 1 9 7 9 ) .  Also see Christian H e t z ,  filM 
Language (New York: Oxford University Press, 1 9 7 4 ) .  
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